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Abstract
This paper studies the potential commitment value of cheap talk inflation announcements in an agent-
based dynamic extension of the Kydland-Prescott model. In every period, the policy maker makes a
non-binding inflation announcement before setting the actual inflation rate. It updates its decisions using
individual evolutionary learning. The private agents can choose between two different forecasting strate-
gies: They can either set their forecast equal to the announcement or compute it, at a cost, using an
adaptive learning scheme. They switch between these two strategies as a function of information about the
associated payoffs they obtain through word-of-mouth, choosing always the currently most favorable one.
We show that the policy maker is able to sustain a situation with a positive but fluctuating fraction of
believers. This equilibrium is Pareto superior to the outcome predicted by standard theory. The influence
of changes in key parameters and the impact of transmission of information among nonbelievers on the
dynamics are studied.
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1 Introduction
In the last three decades or so, time inconsistency and its potential consequences have been a recurrent issue
in economics. In a nutshell, a solution is time inconsistent if the policy maker has incentives to deviate ex
post from the decisions that were initially optimal. The time inconsistent solution is often Pareto optimal.
However, it is not credible since rational agents recognize ex ante that it will not be implemented as announced.
Thus, the economy is likely to end up at a Pareto inferior but time consistent equilibrium. This equilibrium
will often prove to be the Nash solution of a game between the policy maker and the private agents.
The issue has been exhaustively studied in the monetary policy literature following Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), giving rise to a vast literature on credibility building and other means to
practically mitigate the negative consequences of time inconsistency. In particular, diverse studies investigate
the possible use of non binding policy announcements to improve on the Nash solution. Most of them assume
hidden information about the type of the central banker or the state of the economy. In this case, the
policy maker can indeed use a non binding policy announcement that provides a signal about policy maker’s
private information, see Stein (1989), Cukierman (1992), Walsh (1999), Persson and Tabellini (1993)). Hence,
observing the announcement allows for a better prediction of the policy maker’s decision concerning the actual
inflation rate.
In this paper, we also investigate the role of cheap talk announcements by the policy maker as a means to
sustain a Pareto superior solution in economy closely related to the model of Kydland-Prescott (1977). The
mechanisms at play, however, are not related to asymmetric information in the conventional sense. Following
Deissenberg and Alvarez (2002), Dawid and Deissenberg (2005), we assume that each private agent can choose
in any period between two strategies: believe, that is, act as if the policy announcement was true; or not
believe and compute a potentially exact forecast of the policy maker’s next action. Word of mouth information
exchange allows, in each period, a fraction of the agents to compare the past payoffs obtained by following
the one or the other strategy. The agent then adopts the strategy that fared best in this comparison, and
uses it until new information motivates it to switch strategies anew. Thus, the proportions of agents using
the believe strategy may vary over time and can be interpreted as a measure of the policy maker’s credibility.
In the two papers just mentioned, the policy maker and nonbelievers are fully rational, but do not learn.
In this paper, they are boundedly rational but learn, addressing another issue of prime importance in the
monetary policy/time inconsistency context, see e.g. Phelan (2005), Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams and
Sargent (2002), Cho and Sargent (1997). The learning mechanisms used in the related literature include
principally Bayesian updating, recursive least squares, and stochastic gradient learning. Learning either by
the policy maker or the agents, or by both, often narrows the choice of equilibria down to the Nash equilibrium
and to the time inconsistent but Pareto optimal Ramsey outcome. However, simulations of the models show
that the Nash equilibrium occurs most frequently. This contradicts Arifovic and Sargent (2003), who find
from experiments with human agents using Kydland-Prescott model that the Ramsey outcome emerges most
of the time, and that the economy only occasionally slides to the Nash equilibrium.
Departing from the existing literature, we assume that the nonbelievers use a simple adaptive learning
mechanism to update their forecasts. The policy maker uses individual evolutionary learning, Arifovic and
Ledyard (2004). As the authors have shown, and contrary to most evolutionary learning procedures suggested
in the literature, individual evolutionary learning handles environments with large strategy spaces well and
mimics the behavior observed in experiments with human subjects. Moreover, contrary to other arguably
better known learning procedures, it does not model only the refinement of a given behavior as additional
information become available. Rather, it captures a process of purposive exploration of a a priori loosely
determined space of possible rules of action. In that way, it will allow us to show that a policy maker can find
out how to efficiently use cheap talk announcements to increase its payoffs, rather than only demonstrating
that learning can fine-tune the parameters of a given decision-making rule. That is, it will permit us to, in
a limited way, document on the emergence of cheap talk announcements as an effective policy tool. As an
additional benefit, our results will prove closely related with, or at least not contradictory to, the experimental
ones.
Still another central issue addressed in the paper is the importance of the heterogeneity in agents, forecasts,
and forecasting rules. At the empirical level diverse studies, surveyed by Branch (2004a), find persistent
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heterogeneity in survey data on inflationary expectations. But heterogeneity has become also an increasingly
influential strand of research in macroeconomics, following among others Evans and Ramey, (1992, 1998),
Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), Branch and Evans (2006b, 2007), Berardi (2007). In these models, the
agents have different forecasting models. Equilibria with heterogeneity of beliefs, i.e. with positive fractions
of agents using different forecasting models, can arise. Interesting phenomena take place that are not present
in the standard models with homogeneous expectations. See Branch (2004) on the importance of explicitly
modeling heterogeneity, and Giannitsarou (2003) and Honkapohja and Mitra (2005, 2006) on different possible
forms of heterogeneity.
The inclusion of two forecasting models (believe/not believe) allows us to contribute to the discussion
concerning the importance of an explicit representation of varying degrees of agents heterogeneity in macroe-
conomic models. So does also the comparison we conduct between two different forecast formation schemes
(common and private) for the nonbelievers. In the first case, all nonbelievers share a common forecast based
on a record of all previous actions of the policy maker. In the second, each agent starts learning anew, without
using prior information, each time it switches to nonbelieving. This makes nonbelieving less attractive for
the private agents, but also complicates the task of the policy makers. We will see that this has important
implications for the outcome, and raises difficult questions on whether or not the policy maker should facilitate
information exchange among agents.
In a nutshell, the main research questions addressed in the paper are: Can the policy maker, although it
has very little a priori and online information and is only boundedly rational, build up and nurture a positive
stock of believers? If so, does it lead to Pareto superior outcomes, and under which conditions? What is the
impact of variations of the main model parameters and of the forecasting schemes on the outcome? Are there
preferable (ranges of) values for these parameters? In particular, how much concern for the future should the
policy maker have? What is the preferable speed of learning for the believers? Should the policy maker favor
information exchange among the nonbelievers, and how?
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the static game underlying the agent-based
model, discuss briefly its dynamic extension in Dawid and Deissenberg (2005) and present the agent based
model. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to the presentation and discussion of the simulation results. The final
section 5 briefly summarizes the framework and the main results, and succinctly concludes on the importance
of taking heterogeneity explicitly into account in economic analysis.
2 The Model
2.1 The static game
Before starting with the agent-based dynamic analysis, consider first the underlying one-shot game, see Dawid
and Deissenberg (2005). The economy, a la Kydland-Prescott (1977), consists of a policy maker G and of
a continuum of (private) agents i, i ∈ [0, 1]. Agent’s i unemployment rate ui is given by an expectation
augmented Phillips curve:
ui = u∗ − θ(y − xi), (1)
where u∗ is the natural rate of inflation, ui is agent’s i unemployment rate, xi is the inflation forecasted by
agent i, y is the true inflation, and θ > 0 is a parameter. The payoff of agent i, J i, is given by:
J i = J i(xi, y) = −
1
2
[
(y − xi)2 + y2
]
− ci, (2)
where, as discussed below, ci ≥ 0 is the cost of forming a forecast. The policy maker’s payoff, JG, will be
defined at a later place.
The policy maker and the agents play the following three stages, complete information game:
1. The policy maker announces a level of inflation ya. The announcement is non-binding.
2. Each agent i forms its own forecast xi of the true inflation.
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3. The policy maker sets the true inflation level, y.
Each agent can choose between two strategies: to believe, B, or not to believe, NB. With the first strategy,
the agent sets its inflation forecast equal to the announced inflation:
xi = ya.
We say that the agent is a believer and denote its forecast by xB. The believers do not occur any forecasting
costs: cB = 0.
An agent that uses the second strategy is a nonbeliever. The nonbelievers are traditional rational atomistic
agents that play Nash against the policy-maker. Doing so, they take into account both the proportion φ of
believers in the economy and their forecasts xB. We consider only symmetric equilibria where all nonbelievers
make the same forecast xNB . In the Brock-Hommes (1997) tradition , we assume that the forecasting costs
of the nonbelievers may be positive, cNB ≥ 0, due to the computational, informational and other efforts they
possibly need to make their own forecasts.
The policy maker’s payoff JG is the sum of the φ−weighted average squared rate of unemployment, and
of the squared rate of inflation, i.e.
JG = −
1
2
[φ(uB)2 + (1− φ)(uNB)2 + y2]. (3)
As usual, the game is solved through backwards induction. At the last stage 3, the policy maker knows φ
and the forecasts xB and xNBof the believers and nonbelievers. Maximizing (3) with respect to y given φ, xB
and xNB leads to the policy maker’s optimal reaction function:
y =
θ
1 + θ2
[
u∗ + θφxB + θ(1− φ)xNB
]
. (4)
At stage 2, as previously stated, the believers form their expectations according to:
xB = ya. (5)
The nonbelievers, on the other hand, know φ, ya, and xB , and the optimal reaction function (4). Each of them
is rightly aware that it is too small to influence the policy maker’s actions. Thus, the nonbeliever’s inflation
forecasts are given by
xNB =
θ2φya + θu∗
1 + θ2φ
. (6)
At stage 1, given the optimal forecast functions of the believers and nonbelievers (5, 6), the policy maker
determinates the optimal announcement of inflation, ya, and the optimal actual inflation, y∗,
ya∗ = −
u∗
θ
, (7)
y∗ =
θ(1− φ)
1 + θ2φ
u∗. (8)
Accordingly, the optimal choices of believers and nonbelievers at equilibrium are
xB∗ = ya∗,
xNB∗ = y∗.
Notice that the nonbelievers perfectly forecast the true inflation. Notice also that the true inflation, y∗,
decreases with φ. So does the difference y∗ − ya∗ between the true and the announced inflation. Since
xNB∗ = ya∗, this difference is equal to the difference between the forecasts of the nonbelievers and believers,
xNB∗ − xB∗.
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Most important for us is the following. At the equilibrium, the policy maker’s payoff is
JG
∗
= −
1 + θ2
1 + θ2φ
(1− φ)u∗, (9)
the believers’ payoff is
JB∗ = −
1
2
(1 + 2θ2 + 2θ4 − 2φθ4 + φ2 + 2θ4)
θ2(1 + φ+ 2θ2)2
u∗, (10)
and the nonbelievers’ payoff is
JNB∗ = −
1
2
y∗2 = −
1
2
[
θ(1− φ)
1 + θ2φ
u∗
]
− cNB . (11)
Thus, for all φ ∈ (0, 1) and sufficiently small forecasting costs cNB , the payoff of the nonbelievers is always
higher than the payoff of the believers: not-believing is individually rational. However, all payoffs increase
with φ: the policy maker, the believers and the non-believers are all better off when the fraction of believers
increases. Indeed, as φ increases, the nonbelievers’ unemployment stays at u∗. However, the true inflation
decreases. This is beneficial for the policy maker, the believers, and the nonbelievers. Furthermore, the
believers’ unemployment decreases, which is good for them and for the policy maker.
Thus, believing is socially efficient. The higher the proportion of believers, the better every actor is. A
situation with a positive fraction of believers Pareto-dominates the one with where all private agents act
rationally. But such a situation is not an equilibrium since any individual agent can improve its payoff by
switching from believing to nonbelieving.
This framework naturally suggest searching for mechanisms that could sustain a Pareto superior equilibrium
with φ > 0. As mentioned in the introduction, we have shown in a previous paper that, in a dynamic setting,
cheap talk announcements can provide such a mechanism. Let us have a closer look at this dynamic version,
as it provides useful insights on the mechanisms at work in the agent-based model.
2.2 An analytical dynamic extension
In a nutshell, assume that (a) the static game just described is played at each instant of time t; (b) the
proportion of believers, φ, increases over time whenever the instantaneous payoffs received by the believers
are larger than the ones received by the nonbelievers, decreases if they are smaller; and (c) the policy maker
is aware of the φ−dynamics and solves a standard optimal control problem to maximize with respect to the
time paths of the two decision variables ya and y its cumulated discounted stream of payoffs. The nonbelievers
build their expectations according to the equilibrium forecast of the static game given by (6) and do not learn.
The dynamic model always has a stable equilibrium at φ0 = 0. However, if the policy maker is sufficiently
patient (i.e., uses a sufficiently low rate of time preference), the model also admits an equilibrium at some
interior value of φ, φE , with 0 < φE < 1. The instantaneous payoffs of the policy maker and of the private
agents are larger at φE than at φ0.
A threshold φS , 0 < φS < φE , separates the basins of attraction of the two equilibria: If the initial value
of φ is less than φS , it is optimal for the policy maker to let the economy converge towards φ0 = 0, that
is, to let the stock of believers go to zero. This may appear counterintuitive, since the instantaneous payoffs
of the policy maker are smaller at φ0 than at φS . However, the smaller payoff at equilibrium is more than
compensated by the gains the policy maker makes by exploiting the stock of believers in the transitory phase
towards the equilibrium φ0. If the initial value of φ is greater than φS , it is optimal to build up a stock of
believers until φE is reached.
In the dynamic setting, the policy maker never implements the actions that are optimal in the static
game unless φ = 0. That is, it never optimizes its instantaneous payoff. Rather, it implements an actual
inflation that lies closer to the optimal static announcement (7) than the statically optimal reaction function
(8) suggests. Doing so, it increases the payoffs of the believers compared to those of the nonbelievers. This, in
turn, increases the rate of change of φ, with positive consequences for the policy maker’s cumulated payoffs.
Similar considerations also drive the dynamic of the policy maker’s actions in the agent based model we consider
here, but we shall see that the arising dynamic patterns and implications are richer and quite different.
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2.3 The agent-based formulation – common forecasts
The agent-based model is closely related to the static game and its dynamic extension presented above. The
variables are the same as before. In every period t the same actors carry the same sequence of actions. The
economy (1) and the instantaneous payoffs (2) and (3) are unchanged. The proportion of believers changes
depending upon the difference in the payoffs received by the believers and nonbelievers.
Minor differences from the previous framework are that time is now discrete, and that the number of
agents is finite (but typically large.) The crucial departure is the hypothesis that the policy maker and the
nonbelievers are boundedly rational and use individual evolutionary respectively adaptive learning to improve
their decisions over time. This might lead to heterogeneity of expectations not only between believers and
nonbelievers but also among nonbelievers. Agents know the economy (1) and observe without delay the actions
of the other actors, but do not know precisely how these actions are taken. That is, they act under a substantial
veil of ignorance. The policy maker, in particular, no longer optimizes but attempts to improve its actions
using a genetic-algorithm-inspired learning procedure. The details of these modifications are presented in the
next sub-sections. The pseudo-code of the model is presented in Appendix A.
2.3.1 The private agents
At the beginning of any period t, there are µt believers and νt nonbelievers, with µt + νt = Θ, where Θ is the
(constant) total number of agents in the population. Accordingly, the fraction of beleivers at t reads φt =
µt
Θ
.
As in the static game, the policy maker announces yat , and the believers set their inflation forecasts equal to
the announcement, xBt = y
a
t . Contrary to the static case, however, the nonbelievers cannot perfectly predict
the actions of the policy maker in the current period. They know that these actions may change over time
in a for them unpredictable manner. They use an adaptive learning scheme to revise from period to period
the way they form their forecasts. Specifically, we assume that they add an error correction term, dt, to the
forecast that would had been optimal in the static game,
xNBt = x
NB
t (static) + dt,
where xNBt (static) is given by (6). In other words, they use the static game as a reference situation. However,
they know that the policy maker takes into account intertemporal effects and adapts its policy in an unpre-
dictable manner and try to adaptively improve their forecasts over time. At the end of each period, the error
correction term dt is updated as a function of the discrepancy between predicted and realized inflation,
dt+1 = dt + γ(yt − x
NB
t ), (12)
d0 = 0, (13)
where γ > 0 is a parameter capturing the speed of learning. It should be noted that due to this dynamic
adaptation algorithm the forecasts of nonbelievers converge over time to the actual value of the inflation rate
if this rate stays constant. Put differently, in case the actions of the policy maker settle at a steady state all
nonbelievers in the population eventually attain correct inflation forecasts.
Moreover, φ is now a dynamic variable. It changes, following a word-of-mouth information exchange among
the private agents, as a function of the payoff difference between believers and nonbelievers. This is modelled
in the following way. In each period, a fraction β of the private agents is chosen randomly. The chosen agents
are then randomly paired, e.g., agent i with agent k. Each agent i, k observes its partner’s current strategy, to
believe or not to believe. It also imperfectly observe the payoff of the other agent. Agent i e.g. observes the
payoff of its partner, agent k, as
Jkobserved = J
k + ǫ,
where ǫ is a random noise. If J i < Jkobserved, that is, if agent i’s payoff proves smaller than k’s observed payoff,
agent i adopts the strategy of agent k. Thus, a believer may become a nonbeliever, and vice versa.
The resulting dynamics of φt is stochastic. Assuming for analytical simplicity that ǫ is drawn from a
distribution qualitatively similar to a Gaussian distribution1, the expected change in the proportion of believers
1To obtain the analytically convenient expression (14), we assume that ǫ is drawn from the unimodal distribution with mean
zero: ǫ = 2 tan(π ∗ (rand− 0.5))/π, with rand drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1].
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is given by
∆φˆt := IEφt+1 − φt = βφt(1− φt)arctan(J
B
t − J
NB
t ). (14)
In the case of common forecasts we suppose that, when an agent switches from B to NB, it observes the com-
mon value of d used by the others nonbelievers. Thus, all nonbelievers have the same d in any t, independently
of their history of strategy choices.
2.3.2 The policy maker
At the beginning of each period t, the policy maker randomly chooses the announcement yat it will make
and the inflation rate yt it will implement from a given pool Yt = {y
a
t (j), yt(j)} of N possible actions or
rules [yat (j), yt(j)] , j = 1, 2, ..., N . The initial pool of rules, Y0, is assumed to be inherited from past history
(In practice, this means that it will be randomly generated). From period to period, the current pool Yt
is revised in a way that allows a systematic exploration of the space of all potentially possible rules, and
not only of those present in Y0. One speaks of experimentation. Parallely, replication attempts to improve
over time the quality or fitness of the rules in the current pool. Finally, in every period, the policy maker
randomly chooses the rule to be actually used with a probability proportional to its fitness (rule selection).
This genetic-algorithm-inspired procedure known as individual evolutionary learning works as follows.
Experimentation Experimentation is used to generate new rules that are not included in the current pool
Yt. Each element of each rule [y
a
t (j), y
a
t (j)] ∈ Yt, j ∈ {1, .., N}, is changed independently with some probability
mexp. The new value after experimentation is computed as:
new value = old value+ ξ,
where ξ is a random number drawn from a standard Normal distribution.
Computation of foregone outcomes, fitness and the pseudo-value function After having observed
the actions taken by the private agents, the policy maker G is able to calculate both the payoff it would had
received if it had used in period t any other rule in Yt, and the corresponding expected change in φt . Let
the values that would had been obtained by using the rule [yat (j), yt(j)] ∈ Yt be noted J˜
G
t (j), u˜
B
t (j), etc (see
Appendix B for details). We have
J˜Gt (j) = −
1
2
[φt(u˜
B
t (j))
2 + (1− φt)(u˜
NB
t (j))
2 + y2t (j)]. (15)
Now, if G was solving a standard dynamic optimization problem (maximizing its cumulated payoffs subject
to the relevant dynamic constraints), the value for G of using a given rule j would not be limited to the resulting
instantaneous payoff J˜Gt (j). It would also include the changes in the state variables, weighted by the proper
dynamic multipliers, in order to capture the consequence of these changes on the future optimal payoffs stream.
We do not assume that the policy maker acts based on infinite horizon dynamic optimization, but nevertheless
takes into account the intertemporal effects of its policy. Thus motivated, we assume in this paper that G
values the quality or fitness of the different rules it might had used in t in terms not of J˜Gt (j) but in terms of
the pseudo-value function
V Gt (j) = J˜
G
t (j) + Ω ∆φ˜t(j),
where Ω > 0 is a parameter and ∆φ˜t(j) the expected change of φt if rule j had been applied (see Appendix
B). In that way, it assigns a positive value to an increase in φ, that is, takes into account that a higher φ now
should allow higher payoff in the future. Loosely speaking, the parameter Ω measures the concern of G for
the long term consequences of its actions.
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Replication Replication increases the frequency of high fitness rules. It allows rules that are likely to
generate high payoffs to replace inferior ones. In the model, replication occurs through so-called tournament
selection. Pairs of rules are drawn randomly with replacement from the existing pool. The rule with the higher
replaces in the pool the one with the lower fitness. The procedure is repeated N times, leading to a new pool
with an increased proportion of high fitness rules.
Rule selection Experimentation and replication allow the policy maker to construct starting with Yt a
potentially improved pool of rules, Yt+1. Compared to Yt, the new pool Yt+1 contains both new rules and a
higher proportion of rules with high fitness. The rule effectively used in t+ 1 is chosen randomly from Yt+1,
with a probability that is increasing with the rule fitness. Specifically, we assume that the probability for rule
j to be used in period t+ 1 is given by:
Pt+1(j) =
V Gt (j)∑N
i=1 V
G
t (j)
. (16)
Note, however, that the fitness is evaluated on the basis of the actions of the agents in period t. Since these
agents learn between t and t + 1, it is not warranted that a rule that is highly fit in the sense defined above
will indeed perform well when applied in t+ 1.
2.4 The agent-based formulation – private forecasts
The previous version of the agent-based model captures an extreme situation: In every period all nonbelievers
share the same error correction term dt and thus make the same forecast x
NB
t . In other words, this version
is compatible with the existence of a representative nonbeliever. To investigate the impact of additional
heterogeneity in a well defined benchmark case , we also consider the following variant. Whenever an agent i
starts using the NB strategy (say, in t), it has no information additional to the one describing the static game
and therefore uses the statically optimal reaction function (6) to make its prediction for period t. That is, it
uses 0 as value of the error correction term in period t. In the subsequent periods, and as long as it uses the
NB strategy, it updates the error correction term according to (12)˙. In this way, we introduce heterogeneity
among the nonbelievers: Each nonbeliever uses in each t its own, private error correction term dit (Notice
that all agents that became believers in the same period nonetheless use the same error correction term).
Accordingly, the forecast of a nonbeliever i in period t is given by
x
NB,i
t =
θ2φty
a + θu∗
1 + θ2φt
+ dit (17)
and its payoff by
J
NB,i
t = −
1
2
[(yt − x
NB,i
t )
2 + y2]− cNB . (18)
Since dit is individually determined, these forecasts and payoffs may differ from nonbeliever to nonbeliever.
The unemployment of the nonbelievers is now
uNBt = u
∗ − θ
(
yt −
1
νt
νt∑
i=1
x
NB,i
t
)
,
where νt is, as previously stated, the current number of nonbelievers. Otherwise, the model is unchanged.
3 Simulation Results
Unless stated otherwise, we use in the simulations the following baseline parameter values:
• u∗ = 5.5, θ = 1, see Sargent (1999)
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• β = 0.05, c = 0.1, γ = 0.1, Ω = 1000
• mexp = 0.2, Θ = 100, N = 100
In period 0, each agent is initialized as a believer or a nonbeliever with probability 1/2. The N initial rules
in Y0 are randomly generated from the uniform distribution with support [-10,15]. So is the rule [y
a
0 , y0] used
in t = 0. As previously indicated, d0 = 0.
Simulations are run for T = 300 periods. All data presented in the tables and figures are averages over 100
runs. The results are robust – qualitatively similar outcomes are obtained for wide ranges of parameters.
For future comparison, note that for the parameters values u∗ = 5.5 and θ = 1 used in the simulations the
instantaneous payoffs are JG∗ = −30.25 and JNB∗ = −30.25 at the equilibrium with φ = 0 (no believers).
3.1 Dynamics under common forecasts
Figure 1 illustrates the typical dynamics of φt, J
G
t , y
a
t , yt, x
NB
t − yt, and x
B
t − yt in our agent-based economy
for a sufficiently large Ω. After some initial transients, a clear pattern arises between periods 50 and 200.
The true inflation yt oscillates around zero. The announced inflation y
a
t is smaller than yt, but to a large
extend exhibits fairly parallel oscillations. This oscillatory behavior makes it impossible for the nonbelievers
to effectively adjust their learning parameter dt.Compared to those of the believers, their forecast errors remain
large and their payoffs low. Accordingly, the stock of believers keeps increasing. Once the policy maker has
built up a high proportion of believers it starts (around period 150) to exploit their gullibility by increasing
the difference between announced and true inflation. The payoffs of the believers fall below the payoffs of
the nonbelievers, and φ starts to decrease. At the same time, the payoffs of the policy maker increase due
to a decrease in the unemployment of the believers. However, since now JB < JNB , the change ∆φ in the
proportion of believers becomes negative, with adverse consequences for the future payoffs JG. Therefore,
around period 220, the policy maker tries to reverse this downward trend by reducing the discrepancy between
ya and y. The payoffs of the believers increase, leading to an increase of φ to 0.7 at t ≈ 260. Then, the policy
maker starts again exploiting the large stock of believers. It announces an inflation of about -5.5 but sets y
close to 0 (these are the optimal values for the policy maker in the static game). This leads to a new reduction
of the proportion of believers.
Thus, one observes irregular cycles consisting in a phase of trust building (where the policy maker makes
the believers better off than the nonbelievers) followed by a phase of trust exploitation (where the policy maker
uses the high proportion of believers to increase its own payoffs at their expense). During the fluctuations
described here the average payoff of the private agents and the payoff of the policy maker are higher during
the periods with a large proportion of believers. This does not preclude the possibility that the payoffs of all
or some actors are very low in some transitory phase just after initialization, reflecting the fact that the actors
did not learn and still have a very arbitrary behavior at that time. For that reason, we will typically disregard
outcome of the 20 first periods when analyzing the results.
Thus, cheap talk can sustain in the long run a situation with a positive, fluctuating proportion of believers.
Most importantly, the first row of Table 2 shows that this cyclical behavior is Pareto-superior compared to the
standard Nash solution with φ = 0. The average payoff of the policy maker is higher, −16 instead of −30.25.
So are the average payoffs of the private agents (−11.07 for the believers and −4.40 for the nonbelievers,
compared to −30.25 for all agents at the Nash equilibrium).
In other words, in spite of the fluctuations and of the forecast errors they generate, cheap talk can indeed
sustain not only a positive fraction of believers, but more crucially: it can lead to Pareto-superior outcomes.
However, although true for large ranges of parameters, this may not be valid for other. In particular, as
mentioned earlier, the results presented in Figure 1 require sufficiently large values of Ω, that is, sufficient
concern of the policy maker for the future. For lower values of Ω it is possible to generate simulations where φ
becomes zero in finite time. Such an extinction of the believers’ population will also occur if, e.g., the policy
maker learns too slowly, due among others to too small a value of the rate of experimentation mexp.
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3.2 Is there an optimal value of Ω?
By construction, a high value of Ω implies that the policy maker gives much weight to an increase over time
in the proportion of believers and thus, favors a solution with a high average value of φ. Our discussion of the
dynamics in the agent-based model and of the underlying static game suggests that a higher φ should make it
easier the policy maker to achieve higher instantaneous payoffs. However, increasing the stock of believers is
not without cost. To achieve and sustain a high value of ∆φ, the policy maker must favor the believers and,
therefore, accept lower current payoffs. Therefore, it is not clear whether or not an increase of Ω implies a
higher cumulated payoff for the policy maker.
In order to shed light on this issue, let define the discounted cumulated payoff of the policy maker as
ΓG =
T∑
t=0
ρtJ˜Gt ,
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Figure 2 shows how ΓG varies with Ω for Ω ∈ [800, 2000] and ρ = 0.982.
One recognizes that ΓG is first increasing, then decreasing in Ω. To understand this result remember that
a policy maker with a high value of Ω is strongly concerned with the stock of believers and, therefore, with
the believers’ payoffs. These payoffs depend on the deviation between the believers’ inflation forecast and the
actual inflation, that is, between ya and y. Thus, the higher Ω is, the lower is, ceteris paribus, the difference
ya − y. However, a low value of ya − y implies a high current unemployment and a low value of the current
payoff JG. If the value of Ω is excessive, the short term losses needed to obtain a high value of φ dominate
the gains this high value generates in the long term, and ΓG decreases.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis: The impact of cNB and γ
From the previous discussion it should be clear that, ceteris paribus, the policy maker G would welcome any
parameter change that lowers the instantaneous payoffs of the nonbelievers compared to those of the believers.
Such a change indeed allows G to invest less effort (that is, to forego a smaller fraction of its instantaneous
payoffs) to insure relatively high payoffs to the believers and, thus, to insure a high value either of ∆φ or of φ.
Two parameter changes are of particular interest in that regard: an increase of the nonbelievers’ forecasting
costs, cNB ; and a decrease of their learning speed γ. As we shall see, both changes indeed increase G’s average
payoff J¯G and cumulated discounted payoff ΓG. However, they have markedly different impacts on the key
economic variables, as the simulations presented below will show. In these simulations, we use as before
ρ = 0.98 to compute ΓG. The parameter Ω is given the value Ω = 1000, that is, the value that roughly
maximizes ΓG for the reference parameter constellation. We use a Wilcoxon test to check whether or not the
changes in cNB and γ generate statistically significant differences in the average values of the main variables3.
Impact of an increase in cNB Table 2 shows the discounted payoff ΓG as well as the averages over periods
20 to 300 of the main variables of interest for cNB = 0.1 (its value in the basis scenario) and cNB = 1. A bar
above a variable indicates a time average. Row 3 of the table gives the significance levels of the Wilcoxon
test. It indicates that the differences between the two sets of runs are almost always statistically significant
at the 95% level.
One recognizes that y¯a and y¯ both decrease when cNB increases. Furthermore, |y¯a − y¯| becomes smaller.
This tends to increase both φ¯ and J¯G. However, the average unemployment rates of both believers and
nonbelievers also increase, with adverse effects on both ΓG and J¯G. Since ∆φ > 0 and uB < uNB , however,
the increase in average unemployment is smaller at the population level than the increase observed for each
agent type. In toto, the policy maker average payoffs increase.
2If one interprets each period as two weeks, which seems reasonable given β = 0.05 and the adjustment speed of φt, this
corresponds to a yearly discounting of about 10%.
3To carry out the statistical analysis of the effects of changes of cNB we generate 100 pairs of (γ,Ω) values using a uniform
distribution on [0.01, 0.1]× [800, 1300]. For each of these (γ,Ω) pairs one simulation is run with cNB = 0.1 and one with cNB = 1,
where all remaining parameters are set to their default values. Differences of the variable under consideration between the two runs
are taken for each of the 100 parameter profiles and the Wilcoxon test is used to check whether the differences are (statistically)
significantly above or below zero. Analogous for changes of γ.
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Likewise, both nonbelievers and believers are better off after an increase in cNB , due to the decrease in the
difference |y¯a − y¯| and to the lowering of the rate of inflation. Moreover, since the believers obtain a higher
payoff than the nonbelievers, and since φ¯ increases, the average payoff of the private agents also increases.
Impact of a decrease in γ Quite a different picture emerges when γ is reduced from γ = 0.1 to γ = 0.01,
see Table 3. Here again, he differences between the two sets of runs are almost always statistically significant
at the 95% level, see Row 3 of the Table. Now, the policy maker reacts to the parameter change not by
decreasing, but by strongly increasing |y¯a − y¯|. The announcement y¯a decreases, the average inflation rate
goes up. As a consequence, one observes in the long run a decrease in the proportion of believers. However, the
policy maker is able to quickly reduce unemployment among the believers to zero and, therefore, increases its
payoffs in the short run. Since the benefits occur early, this results in an increase of its discounted cumulated
payoff ΓG. But the loss of credibility in later periods implies a lower average payoff J¯G. What is more, both
believers and nonbelievers have lower average payoffs after a decrease of γ.
We thus have the striking result that the policy maker, although best off when confronted with a population
consisting only of believers, obtains a higher average payoff when the nonbelievers are efficient learners, able
to adjust quickly their forecasts to a changing realty. Society as a whole profits, too, from more efficient
nonbelievers.
Is there an optimal cNB? Additional simulations indicate that the described above hold for all cNB ∈
[0.1, 1] and γ ∈ [0.01, 0.1]. A decrease in the learning speed γ induces the policy maker to lower unemployment.
This results in a worse long-run economic outcome for all agents. By contrast, an increase in the forecasting
costs cNB triggers a policy that primarily aims at insuring a low inflation rate. This leads to a larger proportion
of believers, supported by small differences between the announced and the true inflation, and to higher payoffs
for all actors.
However, one may wonder whether increasing in cNB always improves the payoffs. Is there rather an
optimal level of cNB behind which the one or the other payoff starts declining? To address this question, we
plot in Figure 3 the average payoffs of G and of the Bs and NBs as cNB varies from 0 to 4 in increments of
0.1. One recognizes that the payoff of the believers reaches a maximum for cNB = 1.3 while the payoff of the
nonbelievers is highest for cNB = 0.8. The average, φ−weighted payoff of all private agents also reaches it
maximum at cNB = 0.8. By contrast, ΓG and J¯G increase monotonically with cNB .
An examination of the time series shows a sharp qualitative change in the policy maker behavior around
cNB = 1.3, that is, at the value that maximizes the payoff of the nonbelievers. The policy maker stops
implementing a low y and starts increasing the gap between ya and y. As a consequence, the believers’
unemployment rate decreases. This behavior is similar to the one observed when γ is low.
4 Dynamics under private forecasts
So far we have assumed common forecasts, i.e., we supposed that all nonbelievers always use the same error
correction term d. In other words, we hypothesized that a private agent who just started using the NB
strategy is able to forecast the true inflation rate as accurately as other nonbelievers with a possibly long
learning history. As an other extreme case, we now consider the private forecast situation described in section
2.4. Here an agent, when becoming a believer, cannot rely on any knowledge accumulated by the other
nonbelievers but must start from the onset a new individual learning process, using 0 as initial value of its
error correction term. Thus, an agent that just decided to use the strategy NB is likely to make larger forecast
errors under the private than under the common forecast regime. This, in turn, may lower its payoffs and
make it more prone to switch back to the B strategy. In other words, private forecasts make switching to the
NB strategy potentially more costly and less stable.
4.1 Comparison of the baseline simulations under common and private forecasts
Table 4 summarizes the outcome of siumulations under common and private forecasts, using the baseline values
of the parameters. Here again, the values for the first 20 periods have been discarded while constructing the
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averages. One recognizes that φ¯, ΓB, y¯, y¯a, and u¯B are lower, and u¯NB is higher in the private than in the
common forecast case. The differences between the two sets of runs are almost always statistically significant
at the 95% level, as indicated by the significance levels of the Wilcoxon test, see row 3.
The economy’s time behavior under the private forecast regime is illustrated in Figure 4. Compared to
the common forecast case (Figure 1), φ at first increases faster but starts to decrease earlier. As noted before,
this results in a lower average φ¯. The dynamics can be explained in the following way. Initially, it is easier
for the policy maker to build up the proportion of believers because, as previously explained, switching to
nonbelieving is less attractive. Once the policy maker builds up a large stock of believers, it starts exploiting
it by increasing the gap between actual and announced inflation. This leads to a decrease in the proportion
of believers.
Compared to the common forecast case, the greater heterogeneity of the private forecasts makes it more
difficult for the policy maker to determine the actual inflation rate that maximizes its payoff. As a result, even
in the long run, the average forecast of the nonbelievers overstate the actual inflation rate, and the average
unemployment of the nonbelievers is larger than the natural rate of u∗ = 5.5 (see table 4). This leads to lower
payoffs for both G and the NBs. The existence of a systematic forecasting bias by the nonbelievers is a strong
illustration of the coordination problems that may arise in a system with a high level of agents’ heterogeneity.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis: The impact of cNB and γ
As noted earlier, in case of common forecasts, the policy maker responds in qualitatively different ways to
changes in the parameters cNB and γ. An increase in cNB leads to less inflation, a decrease in γ to a lower
unemployment. Up to some threshold value, an increase in cNB improves the average payoffs of all actors,
while a decrease in γ increases ΓG but reduces J¯G, J¯B , and J¯NB .
The impact of cNB in the private forecast case Table 5 shows the effect of an increase of cNB from
0.01 to 0.1 on the key variables in the private forecast case. Row 3 of the table gives the significance levels of
the Wilcoxon test already applied in the common forecast case.
One recognizes that an increase in cNB no longer leads to a reduction in inflation, but to a lowering of
unemployment. The true inflation goes up, the announced inflation goes down, and the gap between these
two values widens. This reduces the unemployment rate of the believers, with favorable consequences for the
policy maker. However, φ¯ decreases, leading to a lower average payoff J¯G. The timing of the different effects
is such that ΓG nonetheless increases. Contrary to the common forecast case, the average payoff of both the
believers and the nonbelievers decreases.
Thus, an increase of cNB is no longer Pareto-improving. However, remember that in the common forecast
case the impact of such an increase was not monotonic. Behind a certain threshold, increases in cNB lead to
lower payoffs for all agents. We have argued that using individual forecasts imposes, in a sense, additional
costs on the nonbelievers. Thus, it might lower this threshold. Could our last results be simply explained by
the fact that the high value we used for cNB , 0.1, was superior to this lower threshold?
Figure 5 confirms the dual hypothesis of a lower threshold that is inferior to 0.1. The figure was produced
analogously to figure 3 by letting cNB vary from 0 to 0.4 by increments of 0.01. One recognizes that J¯B is
highest for cNB = 0.02, while J¯NB reaches a maximum for cNB = 0.01. The average φ−weighted payoff of
the whole population is highest for cNB = 0.01. Thus, contrary to the common forecast case, increasing cNB
above 0.1 is not Pareto-improving. As before, ΓG and J¯G keep increasing with cNB , up to some volatility.
The impact of γ in the private forecast case The result of a lowering of γ from 0.1 to 0.01 and those
of the associated Wilcoxon test are presented in Table 6. When the speed of learning, γ, is reduced, y¯ and
y¯a both decrease while |y¯a − y¯| increases. The higher value of |y¯a − y¯| leads to a reduction of u¯B . Since the
speed of learning γ is lower, the nonbelievers make larger forecast errors and therefore experience a higher
rate of unemployment. Contrary to the common forecast case, φ¯ increases. Since y¯ and u¯B decrease but φ¯
increases, J¯G and ΓB are lower. So are J¯B and J¯NB . Overall, we observe that the direction of movement of
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JG,disc φ¯ y¯ UB UNB
γ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
c ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Table 1: Effect of changes of the speed of error correction learning (γ) and the cost of forecasting for non-
believers (c). The first arrow in each cell gives the effect under common forecasts of non-believers, the second
under private ones.
the unemployment rates triggered by a decrease of γ is the same for the common and private forecast cases.
The direction of movement of the inflation rate differs however between the two cases.
The consequences of heterogeneity As we have seen, the impact of changes in cNB and γ are very
different in the case of common and private forecasts, see Table 2 and Table 5, Table 3 and Table 6. In
particular, the policy response (acting primarily on the unemployment or the true inflation) depends crucially
from the modalities of forecast formation. Table 1 summarizes these differences. The first arrow in each cell
indicates the direction of change of the time averaged variable in the common, the second the direction of
change in the private forecast case. For changes in the speed of learning (γ) the direction, in which the fraction
of believers and the inflation rate move, differs between the common and private forecasts case. If the cost of
forecast formation of non-believers (c) varies, then all listed variables other than the discounted payoff of the
policy maker move in opposite directions under common and private forecasts!
All this illustrates the crucial importance of explicitly taking into account potential agent heterogeneity
when devising and analyzing policy measures. The only difference between the scenarios considered here lies
in the homogeneity or the heterogeneity of the nonbelievers’ forecasts. Nevertheless two qualitatively very
different policy reactions to a change of cNB or γ are observed. Thus, in the present setting but presumably
also in many others, using an heterogenous agent model appears unavoidable if one wants to exhaustively
examine the qualitative features of the problem of interest.
In our model, the policy maker obtains a higher payoff when the nonbeliever’s forecasts are homogenous.
Thus, it has an incitation to facilitate the information flow between nonbelievers, thus helping those agents
that just adopted the NB strategy to build on the experience of the other nonbelievers. Making too much
data publicly available might, however, reduces the forecasting costs cNB. This, as we have seen above, is not
necessarily desirable. Thus, the policy maker faces the non-trivial problem to keep the informational costs of
the nonbelievers as high as possible while avoiding that they build wildly diverging and inexact forecasts.
4.3 A more differentiated look at the effects of parameter changes
In order to shed additional light on the mechanisms that underlie the reported consequences of parameter
changes under common and private forecasts, we consider in more detail the dynamic patterns of the key
variables in the model. We concentrate on changes of γ, since our main general points can be made for that
case. As a first step we consider (in addition to the time averages for the periods 21 to 300 already presented
in 3 and 6) the time averages over the periods 21 to 100 and 21 to 300. Once again, the Wilcoxon test shows
a statistically significant impact of the studied parameters changes at the 95% level.
Tables 7 and 8 show the results obtained for γ = 0.1 and γ = 0.01 in the common and private forecast
cases. One recognizes that in both cases a lower γ leads to a higher φ¯ over the first 100 periods. Over 300
periods, φ¯ decreases in the common forecast case, but increases if the forecasts are private. In both cases,
φ¯ is lower over 300 periods than over 100 periods. That is summarizing, the proportion of believers always
declines over time, but slower in the private than in the common forecast case.
For a given γ, the true inflation rate y¯ is lower under private forecasts, independently of the time span
considered. In the common forecast case, y¯ decreases over the 100 initial periods, but increases over the 300
periods. The spread |y¯a−y¯| increases over all time intervalls in both the common and the private forecast cases.
Thus, a lower γ implies a reduced unemployment rate for the believers, but a higher one for the nonbelievers
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due to higher forecast errors. Altogether these effects lead to a decrease in J¯G. However, ΓG increases since
y¯ is lower, φ¯ higher, and u¯B lower over the initial 100 periods.
The previous observations allow to summarize the impact of a decrease of the speed of learning γ. In the
case of common as in the case of private expectations, this decrease implies that the nonbelievers take longer
to improve their forecasts. Consequently, the policy maker is able to build up faster a large mass of believers.
In both cases, once φ has reached a sufficiently high value, the policy maker starts to exploit the existing
believers by increasing the spread |ya − y|. This leads to a decline of φ. This decline starts earlier when γ is
lower, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 6 for the common forecasts case, and in Figures 4 and 7 for the private
forecasts case. As can be seen in these figures, in cases of a low speed of adaptation of nonbelievers forecasts
the exploitation of the stock of believers by the government eventually leads to the extinction of believers. This
is not in the (long-run) interest of the policy maker, but in the given stochastic and heterogeneous environment
it is not able to fully predict the impplications of its policy choices. These observations of the dynamics of the
relevant variables reinforce an additional important conclusion: To sustain a positive mass of believers, with
all the associated economic advantages, it is necessary that the nonbelievers update sufficiently quickly and
accurately their forecasts, that is, γ must be sufficiently high. This hinders the policy maker from exploiting
believers excessively and thereby avoids the eventual extinction of believers.
Using private instead of common forecasts has similar consequences than a lowering of γ. The number of
believers starts to decline earlier in the private (Figure 4) than in the common forecast case (Figure 1). The
logic behind this was already discussed. The learning of the nonbelievers is slower in the private forecast case,
since a new nonbeliever ignores the experience accumulated by the others.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated an agent-based dynamic version of the seminal Kydland-Prescott (1977) model.
In our framework, the policy maker makes cheap talk announcements of future inflation before implementing
the true one. The private agents have two possible strategies: Believing, i.e. using the announcement as
forecast for the future inflation; or Nonbelieving, i.e, trying to improve adaptively their inflation forecasts.
They tend to adopt the strategy that provided the highest payoff in the last period.
The policy maker uses individual evolutionary learning to determine how it should set the inflation an-
nouncements and the true inflation in order to gain high payoffs. Doing so, it gives attention to the future
evolution of the stock of believers. Indeed, ceteris paribus, the policy maker receives higher instantaneous
payoffs if the proportion of believers is high. However, since the private agents tend to adopt the strategy that
gives them the highest payoff, building and maintaining such a high proportion implies that the policy maker
must forego possible current gains in order to insure that the believers receive higher payoffs than statically
optimal. In other words,to obtain satisfactory payoffs in every period, the policymaker must solve an complex
intertemporal tradeoff between short and long term gains.
The simulations show that the policy maker is able to learn how to reach an outcome that is Pareto-
superior compared to the one that would be attained if it did not make adequate cheap talk announcements.
This outcome is characterized by a succession of trust building phases, where the announcemnts and the true
inflation are chosen in order to increase the proportion of believers; and of trust exploitation phases, where
the policy maker uses the existence of a large stock of believers to achieve for itself high payoffs at the cost of
a decrease in this stock. Accordingly, the number of believers fluctuates over time, but always remain strictly
positive.
We furthermore showed that the speed with which the nonbelievers learn, and the costs they occur to
compute their inflation forecast are of crucial importance for the qualitative properties of the outcome. Most
importantly, the consequences of a modification of the value of one of these two parameters are not monotonic
in the change. Depending on the starting value and the magnitude of the change, they may e.g. lead the
decision maker to favor either a lower unemployement of the believers or a lower inflation. Thus, in some
numerical exercices, we show that changes in either one of the two parameters can generate strikingly different
policy responses, although they conceptually may appear largely equivalent. Interestingly enough, we show
that the policy maker is better off when the nonbelievers learn relatively fast.
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In the paper, we also investigated the consequences of giving up the assumption of identical nonbelievers,
replacing it by the following hypothesis: Everytime an agent switches from believing to nonbelieving, it
builds independently its inflation forecast without using the information accumulated in the past by other
nonbelievers. This assumption creates an additional heterogeneity among the nonbelievers, tends to lower
the quality of the nonbelievers forecasts, makes the agents less inclined to become nonbelievers, and increases
the probability that they switch back to believing. It also complicates the task of the policy maker, since
it is confronted to many different inflation forecasts (instead of only two). We show that this additional
heterogeneity is in many respects equivalent to a lowering of the nonbelievers learning speed or to an increase
of their forecasting costs. In any event, it can strongly impact on the decision makers actions and the outcome.
An interesting dilemna arises here. The policy maker is better off if all nonbelievers use the same, accurate
inflation forecast. Thus, it is in its interest to facilitate the information flow between nonbelievers so that
each of them can always use the past experience of the others. Doing so may, however, reduce the forecasting
costs of the nonbelievers and therefore dimish the attractivity of being a believer. One is therefore interested
in mechanisms that insure homogenous and accurate nonbeliever forecasts while maintening the incentives for
being a believer. Finding them is not a trivial task.
But not least, all our results strongly suggests that explicitely taking into account the ubiquitous hetero-
geneity that characterizes a real economy is primordial if one wants to reach a proper understanding of its
working and to make appropriate policy recommendations.
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APPENDIX A. The algorithm of the simulation.
Initialization
The policy maker’s rules (yj , y
a
j ), j ∈ {1, .., N}
Agents as believers/nonbelievers
Period t = 1
Step 1 :
Begin period t
The policy maker chooses (yt, y
a
t ) by roulette wheel
The policy maker makes announcement yat
Step 2 :
Agents make forecasts of inflation
Believers: xBt = y
a
t
Nonbelievers: xNBt =
θ2φty
a
+θU∗
1+θ2φt
+ dt
Step 3 :
The policy maker sets actual inflation yt
End of period t
Step 4 :
Update
The policy maker: experimentation and replication
All agents: ’word of mouth’
Nonbelievers: dt+1 = dt + γ(yt − x
NB
t )
Continue into period t = t+ 1
if t ≤ T , repeat from Step 1
if t > T , end of simulation
End of simulation
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APPENDIX B. Computation of hypothetical payoffs.
The hypothetical payoff for each rule [yat (j), yt(j)] ∈ Yt in period t is calculated as:
J˜Gt (j) = −
1
2
[φt(u˜
B
t (j))
2 + (1− φt)(u˜
NB
t (j))
2 + y2t (j)] + Ω ∆φ˜t(j) (19)
The hypothetical values of inflation forecasts for believers are calculated for each rule j’s announcement of
inflation, yat (j), as:
x˜Bt (j) = y
a
t (j) (20)
When computing hypothetical forecasts of nonbelievers, we assume that the policy maker can observe the
average inflation forecasts of nonbelievers in the previous period and that he knows how nonbelievers forecast
are affected by changes in the inflation announcement. The policy maker computes the hypothetical value of
the average nonbelievers’ forecast as:
x˜NBt (j) = x
NB,aver
t +
θ2φt
1 + θ2φt
(yat (j)− y
a
t ) (21)
where xNB,avert =
1
νt
∑νt
i=1 x
i
t.
The hypothetical unemployment rates are computed as
u˜it(j) = u
∗ − θ(yt(j)− x˜
i
t(j)), i = B,NB (22)
The policy maker computes the expected change in the proportion of believers, knowing that it is deter-
mined by (14). The necessary computations include the following:
J˜Bt (j)(x˜
B
t (j), yt(j)) = −
1
2
((yt(j)− x˜
B
t (j))
2 + y2t (j))
J˜NBt (j)(x˜
NB
t (j), yt(j)) = −
1
2
((yt(j)− x˜
NB
t (j))
2 + y2t (j))
∆φ˜t(j) = βφt(1− φt)arctan(J˜
B
t (j)− J˜
NB
t (j))
φ˜t+1(j) = φt +∆φ˜t(j) (23)
If according to these calculations φ˜t+1(j) > 1, then we set ∆φ˜t(j) = 1−φt. If φ˜t+1(j) < 0, then ∆φ˜t(j) = −φt.
APPENDIX C. Tables.
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cost JG,disc J¯G φ¯ y¯ y¯a U¯B U¯NB J¯P,B J¯P,NB
c = 0.1 -745.84 -16.00 0.51 1.82 -0.50 3.18 5.47 -11.07 -4.40
c = 1 -625.99 -11.42 0.69 0.94 -0.83 3.73 5.48 -3.89 -2.30
α 0.000005 0.3859 0.0129 0.00005 0.0885 0.4602 0.0007 0.000005 0.000005
Table 2: Effect of an increase in c with homogeneous expectations of non-believers.
γ JG,disc J¯G φ¯ y¯ y¯a U¯B U¯NB J¯P,B J¯P,NB
γ = 0.1 -745.84 -16.00 0.51 1.82 -0.50 3.18 5.47 -11.07 -4.40
γ = 0.01 -689.80 -17.42 0.35 2.33 -4.04 -0.87 5.63 -33.87 -6.55
α 0.000005 0.3859 0.1492 0.0005 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005
Table 3: Effect of a decrease of γ with homogeneous expectations of non-believers.
type JG,disc J¯G φ¯ y¯ y¯a U¯B U¯NB J¯P,B J¯P,NB
1 -745.84 -16.00 0.51 1.82 -0.50 3.18 5.47 -11.07 -4.40
2 -750.71 -16.51 0.48 1.54 -1.38 2.58 5.70 -14.00 -4.51
α 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 0.242 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005
Table 4: The difference between simulations with homogeneous and heterogeneous nonbelievers. Row 1 is for the common forecasts case, row 2
is for the private forecasts case.
cost JG,disc J¯G φ¯ y¯ y¯a U¯B U¯NB J¯P,B J¯P,NB
c = 0.1 -750.71 -16.51 0.48 1.54 -1.38 2.58 5.70 -14.00 -4.51
c = 1 -659.30 -16.59 0.44 1.85 -3.04 0.61 5.63 -25.01 -6.15
α 0.000005 0.00005 0.0015 0.0019 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005 0.000005
Table 5: Effect of an increase of c with heterogenous expectations of nonbelievers.
γ JG,disc J¯G φ¯ y¯ y¯a U¯B U¯NB J¯P,B J¯P,NB
γ = 0.1 -750.71 -16.51 0.48 1.54 -1.38 2.58 5.70 -14.00 -4.51
γ = 0.01 -697.85 -15.59 0.54 1.03 -3.78 0.69 6.46 -22.34 -4.98
α 0.00005 0.00005 0.4286 0.1562 0.000005 0.0005 0.000005 0.00005 0.00005
Table 6: Effect of a decrease of γ with heterogenous expectations of nonbelievers.
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periods JG,disc J¯G φ¯ y¯ y¯a U¯B ¯UNB ¯JP,B J¯P,NB y − xNB
[21, 100] γ = 0.1 -597.41 -15.41 0.53 1.69 0.38 4.19 5.43 -4.86 -3.79 0.07
γ = 0.01 -552.65 -12.40 0.69 -0.24 -2.77 2.97 6.72 -5.82 -2.22 -1.22
[21, 300] γ = 0.1 -745.84 -16.00 0.51 1.82 -0.50 3.18 5.47 -11.07 -4.40 0.03
γ = 0.01 -689.80 -17.42 0.35 2.33 -4.04 -0.87 5.63 -33.87 -6.55 -0.13
Table 7: Effect of a decrease in γ with homogeneous expectations of nonbelievers.
periods JG,disc J¯G φ¯ y¯ y¯a U¯B U¯NB J¯P,B J¯P,NB y − xNB
[21, 100] γ = 0.1 -604.71 -15.37 0.53 1.18 -0.17 4.15 5.69 -4.38 -3.36 -0.19
γ = 0.01 -577.28 -13.28 0.70 -0.39 -2.62 3.27 7.02 -4.84 -2.59 -1.52
[21, 300] γ = 0.1 -750.71 -16.51 0.48 1.54 -1.38 2.58 5.70 -14.00 -4.51 -0.20
γ = 0.01 -697.85 -15.59 0.54 1.03 -3.78 0.69 6.46 -22.34 -4.98 -0.96
Table 8: Effect of a decrease in γ with heterogenous expectations of nonbelievers.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the fraction of believers (a), policy maker payoffs (b), inflation rate and announced
inflation rate (c), absolute forecast errors (d) for cNB = 0.1, γ = 0.1 in the economy with common forecasts
of nonbelievers.
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Figure 2: Discounted payoff of the policy maker for different values Ω.
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Figure 3: Payoffs of believers and nonbelievers and average agents’ payoffs (a) and discounted and average
payoff of the policy maker (b) for different cost cNB for the case of homogeneous nonbelievers.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the fraction of believers (a), payoff of the policy maker (b), inflation rate and announced
inflation rate (c), absolute forecast errors (d) for cNB = 0.1, γ = 0.1 in the economy with private forecasts of
nonbelievers.
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Figure 5: Payoffs of believers and nonbelievers and average agents’ payoffs (a) and discounted and average
payoff of the policy maker (b) for different cost cNB for the case of private forecasts of nonbelievers.
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Figure 6: Evolution of the fraction of believers (a), payoff of the policy maker (b), inflation rate and announced
inflation rate (c), absolute forecast errors (d) for cNB = 0.1, γ = 0.01 in the economy with common forecasts
of nonbelievers.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the fraction of believers (a), payoff of the policy maker (b), inflation rate and announced
inflation rate (c), absolute forecast errors (d) for cNB = 0.1, γ = 0.01 in the economy with private forecasts of
nonbelievers.
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